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A matter of control or identity? Family firms’ environmental reporting decisions along the 
corporate life cycle 
Abstract  
Building on the socio-emotional wealth (SEW) perspective, this study explores ED practices in 
family firms and investigates whether the firm’s life cycle stage plays a moderating role in these 
practices. We focus on two dimensions of the SEW: family control and influence and family 
identity. To the extent that different types of family-controlled firms have different reporting 
behaviors based on their primary SEW dimension, they will undertake the ED strategies that 
allow them to preserve their SEW. Using a sample of listed firms from the Milan Stock 
Exchange, we show that family firms for which the family control and influence SEW dimension 
is most salient provide less environmental information than non-family firms and that this effect 
is weakened along the family firm’s life cycle. Our findings also indicate that middle-aged 
family firms, where the family identity dimension prevails, provide more environmental 
disclosure than do non-family firms. Our study contributes to knowledge about how the socio-
emotional endowment affects family firms’ reporting behaviour. 
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Recent initiatives calling for a global shift toward a sustainable use of natural resources, such as 
the 21st Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, have pushed environmental reporting to the forefront of the corporate agenda (KPMG 
Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting, 2017),  requiring firms to identify the natural 
environment as a stakeholder (Bansal and Clelland, 2004) and to set comprehensive reporting 
practices that demonstrate responsible environmental stewardship. However, environmental 
reporting, like other forms of disclosure, comes with costs and benefits that determine the firm’s 
incentives for reporting (Arena et al., 2015; Cormier and Magnan, 2015).  
The family nature of family firms is one important, albeit underexplored, factor that 
explains the heterogeneity in environmental reporting practices (Block and Wagner, 2014; 
Laguir et al., 2016). While many studies examine reporting strategies in family firms (Salvato 
and Moores, 2010; Songini et al., 2013), they focus on financial disclosure (voluntary or 
mandatory), analysed through the lens of agency theory (Prencipe et al., 2014), not on the role of 
the family’s preferences and priorities in shaping voluntary environmental disclosures (EDs). 
Understanding how family businesses undertake environmental reporting has wide implications 
for society as a whole, given that family-owned and family-managed firms are among the most 
widespread organizational forms in the world (La Porta et al., 1999), with substantial influence 
on the global economy (Astrachan and Shanker, 2003; Morck and Yeung, 2004).  
Relying on the socio-emotional wealth (SEW) perspective (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 
Berrone et al., 2010; Berrone et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2013), this paper 
investigates ED practices in family firms. The SEW perspective is particularly suitable for this 
research objective, as it focuses on the role of non-economic utility in driving family firms’ 
practices (Achleitner et al., 2014; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014) and identifies a new set of 
incentives that may drive ED practices.  
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We argue that EDs in family firms are driven by SEW motives. While the literature has 
suggested that ED might be either a response to the accountability needs of stakeholders or a 
result of a legitimacy stance (Cormier and Magnan, 2015), we contend that SEW is a 
multidimensional concept (Cennamo et al., 2012; Cruz et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014) 
and focus on two dimensions of SEW that are the most sensitive to stakeholder claims: family 
control and influence and family identity. Furthermore, following Shepherd and Haynie (2009) 
and Zellweger and Dehlen (2012), we analyse to what extent family firms’ EDs are motivated by 
the control and identity dimensions and change along the firms’ life cycles.  
Using the features of the Italian listed companies, we conduct an extensive content analysis 
of their sustainability reports to disentangle the effects of these two ‘family’ dimensions on the 
extent of voluntary EDs. Our results lend support to the theoretical argument that the two 
dimensions act as guiding references for ED in family firms and that their role is not uniform across 
family firms’ life cycles. 
Our research offers important contributions to the growing literature on environmental 
sustainability in family firms (Gallo, 2004; Uhlaner et al., 2004; Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Berrone 
et al., 2010; O’Boyle et al., 2010), uncovering the idiosyncratic family business traits that explain 
their distinctive ED reporting strategies. 
The reminder of the article unfolds as follows. First, we review the extant research in the 
field. Then we discuss our theoretical foundations and develop our hypotheses. Next, we describe 
the research design and data and describe our empirical findings and robustness tests. We conclude 
by highlighting the contributions, implications, and limitations of our study. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
2.1 Empirical evidence on disclosure in family firms  
Although many studies examine the reasons that underlie family firms’ reporting strategies 
(Salvato and Moores, 2010; Songini et al., 2013; Prencipe et al., 2014), empirical evidence so far 
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focuses on mandatory financial disclosures. Some studies suggest a positive relationship between 
family involvement in ownership and management and financial reporting quality (Ali et al., 
2007; Jiraporn and Dadalt, 2009; Cascino et al., 2010), while others report that family 
businesses’ financial reporting quality is lower than that of their non-family-owned counterparts 
(Prencipe et al., 2008; Yang, 2010). 
Unlike financial disclosure, voluntary disclosures often entail unregulated, context-
specific, non-accounting and narrative information. Voluntary disclosure is not audited (or is 
only partially audited), so it is not immediately verifiable by external users (Mercer, 2004). 
Hence its preparers’ incentives are likely to differ from those who prepare mandatory disclosures 
and to present a wider range of opportunities for manipulation (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 
2007). Family managers have discretion on both the decision to release voluntary disclosers and 
the content of the disclosure itself.  
Family owners’ long-term investment horizon and active involvement in management is 
typically associated with a low level of public information (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006), so some scholars report a negative relationship of family ownership 
and management with voluntary disclosure. For example, Ho and Wong (2001) report that the 
percentage of family members on the board is negatively related to the extent of voluntary 
disclosure, and Lakhal (2005) suggests a negative association between voluntary disclosure and 
ownership concentration in the context of French firms. Conversely, Chau and Gray (2010) 
report a positive relationship between family ownership and voluntary disclosure, and Chen et 
al. (2008) find that family firms provide fewer earnings forecasts and conference calls but more 
earnings warnings than other firms do.  
However, the extant research fails to explain the role of voluntary disclosures by family 
businesses because it considers family businesses as homogeneous groups and treats voluntary 
disclosures as a unique set of information. Responding to the call for better identification of 
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disclosure practices from Salvato and Moores (2010), we rely on idiosyncratic features of family 
businesses to explain their distinctive ED strategies. 
 
2.2 The SEW approach to reporting strategies in family firms 
Family businesses are characterized by a higher level of complexity than that of blockholder-
dominated firms because financial and non-financial objectives co-exist in family firms. This 
complexity is often explained using the SEW perspective, which contends that the set of 
incentives family businesses face differ from those of firms with other kinds of concentrated 
ownership, while also recognizing heterogeneity among family firms. Grounded in the 
behavioural agency model developed by Wiseman and Gómez-Mejía (1998), the SEW approach 
underscores the role of non-economic utility in driving family firms’ decisions and behaviours 
(Achleitner et al., 2014; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014). According to the SEW perspective, family 
firms are motivated by and committed to preserving their SEW (Prencipe et al., 2014), which 
refers to the stock of affect-related values that the family derives from its ownership and 
management of its firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). The SEW construct encompasses several 
dimensions: the family’s desire to exercise control over the firm, its identification with the firm, 
strong social ties among family members, emotional attachment of family members, and renewal 
of the family’s bonds to the firm through dynastic succession (Berrone et al., 2010; Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2010; Cennamo et al., 2012). Proponents of the SEW claim that, as the family’s 
SEW becomes the key reference for family principals, they tend to care more about the potential 
for decline than they do gains. Hence, family business principals are loss-averse with respect to 
the SEW and make decisions that preserve SEW, even at the expense of the firm’s economic 
utility. Empirical evidence supports the view that SEW can drive corporate decisions like risk-
taking (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), diversification (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010), compliance with 
environmental standards (Berrone et al., 2010), and R&D investment (Chrisman and Patel, 
2012). 
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Although the number of studies that support the SEW approach is growing, its role in the 
context of reporting practices remains largely unexplored and is usually studied with respect to 
earnings management choices (Stockmans et al., 2010). Pazzaglia et al. (2013) report empirical 
evidence that family-owned firms have higher earnings quality than do firms that are acquired 
through market transactions, arguing that family owners are characterized by a high sense of 
identification with the firm and the wish to protect the family’s reputation in the eyes of external 
stakeholders. Likewise, Achleitner et al. (2014) suggest that family firms engage less in real 
earnings-management practices—as such practices inhibit the firm’s long-term value—than they 
do in earnings-decreasing practices to help the families retain trans-generational control. In 
addition, Martin et al. (2016) show that founder family firms are less likely than non-founder 
family firms to use earnings management to avoid its negative effect on the family’s SEW. 
 
2.3 Family control, family identity, and the firm’s life cycle: implications for ED strategies  
SEW research largely ignores voluntary reporting of environmental information in family firms. 
Gomez-Mejia et al.’s (2014) theoretical study acknowledges the multidimensional nature of the 
SEW, which Berrone et al. (2012) contend consists of five major dimensions—family control 
and influence, family identity, sense of dynasty, emotional attachment, and social ties—) and 
predicts that different types of family-controlled firms might have diverse reporting behaviors. 
The SEW approach is helpful in explaining family firms’ distinctive ED strategies, as the 
strategy that management adopts when engaging in voluntary ED may not be the same as that 
applied to other types of disclosures (Berthelot et al., 2003; Cho et al., 2014).  
Similar to their non-family counterparts, family firms disclose substantive environmental 
information in response the demand of stakeholder groups like employees, management, 
investors, creditors, regulators, unions, and public-interest groups. Such disclosure has been 
found to lead to financial benefits, such as a lower cost of equity capital, higher firm value, and 
fewer analysts’ forecast errors (Aerts et al., 2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Plumlee et al., 2015). 
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ED may also bring non-financial benefits since it legitimates the company’s actions in its society 
and facilitates its long-term prosperity (Martin et al., 2016).  
However, when dealing with ED decisions, family principals face tension between the 
benefits from fulfilling stakeholders’ expectations for information and the costs associated with 
ED (i.e., the potential SEW losses that the family firm internalizes). Consistent with Gomez-
Mejia et al. (2014), we maintain that the evaluation of these benefits and costs depends on the 
SEW dimension that is most salient, which is then reflected in the firms’ ED strategies.  
Following Cennamo et al. (2012), Cruz et al. (2014), and Gómez-Mejía et al. (2014), we 
recognize that the family control and influence and the family identity dimensions are the most 
relevant to external stakeholders, so we build on them to explain their distinctive implications for 
family firms’ ED strategies. Specifically, we argue that firms in which family principals 
prioritise the family control and influence dimension of SEW are more reluctant to provide ED 
since the detrimental effects of this disclosure on their preservation of control overcome the 
gains from greater transparency. Voluntary ED often contains substantial proprietary information 
that reveals the extent to which company operations impact the external environment, as well as 
the activities and processes that the company has in place to manage and measure environmental 
efficiency. The nature of this information imposes proprietary costs on the firm (Dye, 1990) that 
may be a threat to family control. Moreover, the increased visibility associated with ED attracts 
more external capital and enhances the level of scrutiny from regulators and outside shareholders 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001; Graham et al., 2005; Haddock-Fraser and Fraser, 2008), potentially 
limiting the family’s ability to exert its influence over the business without interference from 
other non-family shareholders (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014), a pre-condition 
for perpetuation of the family’s SEW. Furthermore, the decision to issue voluntary ED might 
signal the firm’s commitment to comprehensive and transparent reporting (Verrecchia, 2001), so 
any subsequent interruption of this practice exposes the firm to negative market reaction 
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(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991), challenging the family’s ability to exert control over the 
business.  
Hence, we propose that the fear of losing the family’s control leads family firms to 
withhold ED to ensure the preservation of the family’s SEW, and we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
HP 1: Family firms in which family control and influence is the primary SEW dimension are less 
likely to engage in voluntary ED than non-family firms. 
In a related argument, we contend that firms whose family principals prioritise the family 
identity dimension of SEW are willing to provide ED voluntarily to protect their status and 
image in the community (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014).  
The overlap between the family and the firm, which is often reflected in the choice to 
carry the family name in the firm, increases the concern about the effect that irresponsible 
behavior toward the environment may have on the family’s reputation (Dyer and Whetten, 
2006). In such cases, the visibility of the controlling family is high, increasing external 
monitoring by means of public opinion (Zellweger et al., 2013). These family firms are more 
likely than other firms are to provide ED voluntarily since the benefits of doing so exceed its 
costs. ED strategies create a reputation of transparency that keep the family name secure in the 
capital market (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Graham et al., 2005; Martin et al., 2016) and that help 
to legitimize their company, building a corporate image that is consistent with that of a good 
corporate citizen (Hooghiemstra, 2000). These reputational benefits foster the family’s image, 
thereby perpetuating the firm’s SEW over time.  
Hence, we anticipate that the desire to preserve the family’s identity leads family firms to 
provide ED voluntarily in an attempt to project a positive image of the business and to increase 
its reputation over time. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
HP 2: Family firms in which the family identity is the primary SEW dimension are more likely to 
engage in voluntary ED than non-family firms. 
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We also recognize that family firms’ ED preferences and priorities may differ based on 
the firm’s life cycle stage (Breton-Miller and Miller, 2013). 
During their early years, family firms are typically small and run by the founder, who is 
keen to retain control and pass the business on to his or her descendants. The founder’s strong 
emotional attachment with the firm enhances the family’s commitment to the business and 
strengthens its identification with the firm. At this stage, family agents’ cognitive processes are 
heavily influenced by emotional considerations (Shepherd and Haynie, 2009; Zellweger and 
Dehlen, 2012), and the SEW becomes key in making ED-related decisions. As these firms age, 
the number of family members and generations that are involved in leading the business 
increases, and the family’s stake in the business becomes fragmented. The emergence of family 
branches weakens and strains the family’s identification with the firm (Miller and Breton-Miller, 
2011), and conflicts often arise among family members. As a result, family members’ emotional 
attachment to the firm tends to weaken (Sciascia et al., 2014), while their attention to economic 
objectives, rather than family goals, increases (Lubatkin et al., 2005).  
These arguments suggest that the emphasis on the SEW for ED decisions declines as the 
firm ages, undermining the ability of the SEW dimensions to explain ED. Hence, we argue that 
the family firm’s aging weakens the relationships between the two dimensions of SEW and the 
likelihood that the firm will engage in voluntary ED. 
HP 3: Family firms’ life cycle stage moderates the relationships of the family control and 
influence and family identity SEW dimensions with voluntary ED. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
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Our sample is selected among companies listed on the Milan Stock Exchange and covered by 
Compustat Global during the period from 2012 to 2013. We focus on Italy for two reasons1. 
First, according to the Italian Association of Family Enterprises (Aidaf) almost 85 percent of the 
nation’s companies are family businesses (Aidaf, 2017), and about 60 percent of the companies 
listed on the Milan Stock Exchange are family-owned, representing more than 25 percent of 
market capitalization. Because of this institutional setting’s high degree of ownership 
concentration, family-owned companies are easily disentangled from the solely concentrated 
ones (Cascino et al., 2010). Second, at the time of this study, Italy has no official regulations on 
EDs, which are completely voluntary2.  
We started with a sample of 269 companies that are listed on the Milan Stock Exchange 
and covered by Compustat Global during the period from 2012 to 2013. We excluded financial 
and insurance companies and football clubs, which have different operating and reporting 
structures; companies that do not provide an English version of their CSR reports; and 
companies for which we were unable to collect the data needed for the empirical analysis. These 
exclusions left a final sample of 167 companies and 288 firm-year observations. Most of the 
sample companies belong to the manufacturing sector (58.69%), with the remaining companies 
operating in the transportation and communication sector (17.01%), the service industry 
(11.45%), the wholesale and retail trade sector (5.56%), the agriculture, mining and construction 
industries (5.21%), and public administration (2.08%). 
 
3.2 Selection and definition of variables 
To measure ED, we rely on disclosure indices obtained from the content analysis of 
sustainability reports, the most commonly recognized methodology for measuring the extent of 
                                                 
1 Since EDs differ among countries (Van der Laan-Smith et al., 2005), focusing on one country generates a 
homogenous dataset that ensures a high degree of comparability of the sample companies. However, we caution against 
generalizing our findings, as our limited sample size might lead to biased interpretation. 
2 We chose the 2012-2013 period to neutralize the potential confounding effect of the reforms in environmental laws 
that occurred in subsequent years (i.e., introduction of a tax on waste disposal by the law 147/2013 and the revision of 
the Robin Hood tax by the D.L. n. 69/2013). 
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voluntary disclosure (Botosan, 1997; Garcìa-Meca and Martìnez, 2005; Vourvachis and 
Woodward, 2015). Content analysis is a well-established procedure in the sustainability 
disclosure literature, as it provides valid results with which to evaluate the extent of the 
disclosure of various items (Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Guthrie et al., 
2004)3. We selected sustainability reports for this analysis because they are the most 
comprehensive means of communicating environmental information (Michelon et al., 2015). 
The content analysis was carried out by two expert coders who were neither providers nor 
recipients of the report (the ‘third-party approach’)4. Environmental information was coded using 
a thirty-item checklist that was divided into nine categories or sub-variables, as shown in Table 
1, tailored to the Environmental Indicators provided by the Global Reporting Initiative (hereafter 
GRI) 3.1 Index.  
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
The use of GRI indicators facilitates a high level of objectivity and replicability during 
the coding. Similar to Wiseman (1982), we assigned any relevant item (EDi) a score of 1 if the 
firm provided generic qualitative information, 2 if the firm provided quantitative disclosures, and 
3 if the firm provided monetary information. We awarded zero points to the firm if it provided 
no disclosures and no substantial explanation for the omission5.  
Based on this procedure, the ED index compares the actual disclosure with a total 
possible disclosure, computed as: 
ENV_D= , 
where EDi is the score assigned to the single item i, and max_EDi is the maximum score that can 
be assigned to item i if complete information is provided. The ED index ranged from 0 to 1, such 
                                                 
3 Content analysis allowed us to codify written text into groups and categories based on selected criteria and to draw 
logical inferences by analysing large numbers of reports in terms of their disclosures and omissions (Neuendorf, 2002; 
Krippendorff, 2004). 
4 As a robustness check, we performed an alpha test from Krippendorff (1980) to ensure homogeneity of the content 
analysis process. Specifically, two coders (one author and one research assistant) rated to the same set of environmental 
information provided by a sub-sample of sixty companies. The inter-coder reliability, computed as the Krippendorff’s 
alpha coefficient, was 82 percent, indicating a good level of inter-coder agreement (Neuendorf 2002, p. 145). 








that the more closely the value of the index approaches to 1, the higher the level of ED provided 
by company j in year t. 
To identify family firms, we relied on the level of family ownership (Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006; Miller et al., 2013). We hand-collected ownership data from company reports, the 
AIDA, and CONSOB databases and identified family-controlled firms as those in which 
members of a single family held more half of the firm’s capital directly or through other entities 
(Cascino et al., 2010). We refer to these firms as CONTROL_FF to identify the firms in which 
family principals prioritise the family control and influence dimension of SEW. We identified 
family firms in which family principals prioritised the family identity dimension of SEW 
(IDENTITY_FF) by determining whether the name of the controlling family is part of the firm’s 
name (Deephouse and Janskiewicz, 2013)6. We measured the moderating effect of the family 
firm’s life cycle using the variable AGE, computed as the natural logarithm of the number of 
years since the firm’s foundation (La Rocca et al., 2011).  
We also included several variables that control for potential confounding influences on 
ED (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; García-Sánchez, 2008; Monteiro and Aibar-Guzmán, 2010; 
Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012; Ben-Amar and McIlkenny, 2015): presence of a corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) committee in the board (CSR_COM), presence of a CEO who belongs the 
controlling family (CEO_FAMILY), independence (IND_BOD) and size (N_BOD) of the board 
of directors, firm size (SIZE), financial leverage (LEVERAGE), and profitability (PROFIT). 
Detailed descriptions of the measures of all of the variables are provided in Table 2. 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
                                                 
6 Our classification does not assign each firm to one of these dimensions exclusively, as it is possible that a firm gives 
importance to both family control and influence and family identity. However, the results presented herein do not 
change if we exclusively assign each firm to one or the other dimension. 
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Table 3 offers descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for all of the variables.  
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
The average value of ED is 0.098, with a standard deviation of 0.246, suggesting that the 
sample companies report a low average level of ED. Un-tabulated evidence suggests that the 
most commonly reported items are direct and indirect energy consumption and the monetary 
value of fines and sanctions for non-compliance with environmental laws and regulations (EN3, 
EN4, EN28). On the other hand, information on the environmental impacts and initiatives the 
firm undertook to reduce them (EN12, EN19, EN29) are only briefly referenced or, more 
frequently, completely omitted. The results of the ANOVA tests (untabulated) show that the 
extent of ED significantly differs between family and non-family firms for all disclosure items, 
with the exception of the percentage of the weight or volume of recycled input materials (EN2) 
and the percentage of reclaimed products and their packaging materials (EN27)7. Consistent with 
D’Amico et al. (2016), these findings reveal low dissemination of ED in the Italian context. 
Relying on Wiseman (1982), we classified the disclosure items into four categories—economic 
factors, environmental litigation, pollution abatement, and other ED—and we identify the most 
frequently disclosed ED items in sub-groups of family/non-family firms based on their life cycle 
stage. Descriptive findings reveal that young family firms tend to disclose general information 
on environmental policies and their concern for the environment but do not provide information 
on past or present litigation or disclosures related to economic factors. Middle-stage family firms 
tend to disclose information about pollution abatement (e.g., waste disposal, air emission) and, 
infrequently, litigation. Litigation disclosures are the most frequently disclosed items in old 
family firms, but they still omit information on economic factors. The trends for the most 
frequently reported items for the sub-groups of young, middle-aged, and old non-family firms 
are similar to that observed for the family firms. However, non-family firms’ level of ED is 
                                                 
7 Following Cascino et al. (2010), we defined for the purpose of this comparison family businesses as firms in which 
family members own at least half of the firm. 
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significantly higher in all four categories of the Wiseman list, and they also report on 
environmental costs and expenditures, especially in the early and mature stages. 
Regarding our variables of interest, the mean value of CONTROL_FF is 0.534, while the 
mean value of IDENTITY_FF is 0.145. Hence, despite the large number of family-controlled 
firms among Italy’s listed firms, only a small percentage carries a family name. This picture is in 
line with prior research on family firms in similar settings (Cascino et al., 2010; Campopiano 
and de Massis, 2015). The mean value of CSR_COM (0.159) suggests that, similar to Cucari et 
al. (2017), only a small percentage of family firms have appointed a manager or a unit to be 
responsible for CSR strategies. The mean value of CEO_FAMILY is 0.340, so less than half of 
our sample companies are led by a family member. Although this value is slightly lower than 
that reported in other studies (Miller et al., 2013), it underscores the prevalence of family 
leadership and the difference between the leadership style of Italy’s family firms and that of 
family firms in Anglo-Saxon countries (Block and Wagner, 2014).   
Our firms’ boards of directors have an average of nine members, four of which are 
independent, a finding that is consistent with Patelli and Prencipe (2007). Finally, companies 
appear to be relatively small in size, to be highly leveraged, and to have negative operating 
performance. 
Finally, no correlation is larger than the commonly accepted level of 0.70, and the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is 1.52, so multicollinearity concerns are not raised (Wooldridge, 
2015). 
 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
To test empirically the impact of the family control and influence and family identity dimensions 
on ED and the moderating effect of the family firm’s life cycle stage, we use the following 
regression equation: 
ENV_D = β0 + β1 CONTROL_FF + β2 IDENTITY_FF + β3 CONTROL_FF*AGE  
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+ β4 IDENTITY_FF*AGE + β5 AGE + β6 CSR_COM + β7 CEO_FAMILY  
+ β8 IND_BOD +β9 N_BOD +β10 SIZE +β11 LEVERAGE + β12 PROFIT + ε, [1] 
where β1 and β2 are the coefficients of interest to test H1 and H2, respectively;  
and CONTROL_FF*AGE and IDENTITY_FF*AGE are the interaction terms between 
CONTROL_FF and IDENTITY_FF and the moderator (AGE) to assess how the effects on ED of 
family control and influence and family identity vary along family firms’ life cycle. (Hence, β3 
and β4 test our H3.) We also control for years and sectors (two-digit SIC codes) to remove 
unobserved time and industry heterogeneity that may be associated with disclosure behaviour. 
Table 4 reports the results of these estimations8. 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
Overall, the tested models’ goodness of fit is strong, as the adjusted R2 is 60.2 percent. 
Our results with respect to other control variables are aligned with the extant literature 
since the extent of ED is significantly and positively affected by firm size and the presence of a 
CSR committee (Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Patten, 2002). 
Consistent with H1, we find that the coefficient of CONTROL_FF is negative and 
statistically significant, so family firms in which the control dimension is the more prominent are 
less willing to disclose environmental information than other firms. Conversely, the coefficient 
of IDENTITY_FF is positive and statistically significant, supporting H2, so family firms in 
which the identity dimension prevails are more willing to disclose environmental information 
than other firms. The interaction effects CONTROL_FF_AGE and IDENTITY_FF_AGE are not 
statistically significant, suggesting that the effects of the two SEW dimensions do not change 
across the firms’ life cycle. However, the lack of significance for the interaction effects may hide 
a non-monotonic role of the ‘family’ dimensions in ED decisions during family firms’ life cycle.  
                                                 
8 For the sake of brevity, we do not report or comment on the model without interaction. However, our main results are 
consistent with our prediction, as they show that the coefficient of CONTROL_FF is negative and statistically 
significant and the coefficient of IDENTITY_FF is positive, although not statistically significant. 
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To determine whether the effect of the two SEW dimensions on ED decisions varies non-
monotonically across the stages of family firms’ life cycle, we adopted a cluster analysis 
approach and sorted the sample based on an inductive criterion. This approach helped us 
determine whether there are structural differences among our firms by sorting them into clusters 
that indicate the greatest separation (distance) among the groups (Chiu et al., 2001). We 
identified three clusters (Table 5, panel A) based on firm age—that is, the firm’s life cycle stage. 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
Cluster 1, which contains 21.8 percent of the sample, consists of firms with an average 
age of eleven years (s.d. = 3.717 years). Cluster 2, which contains 51.3 percent of the sample, 
consists mainly of middle-aged firms with an average age of thirty years (s.d. = 7.651 years). 
Cluster 3, which contains 26.7 percent of the sample, consists of older firms with an average age 
of eighty years (s.d. = 30.050 years). Panel B of Table 5 shows the regression results obtained 
from running Equation 1 (without the interaction effects) separately for the three clusters. To 
determine whether the coefficients in the regression model are the same in the three sub-samples, 
we performed the Chow test (Chow, 1960), which confirmed that the coefficients are not equal, 
so the parameters differ significantly. 
Results for young firms (cluster 1) show that the predominance of the family control and 
influence dimension is negatively related to the extent of ED, and family identity does not exert a 
significant influence on ED. In line with the results for the full sample, these young firms show a 
positive effect of firm size, board size, and financial leverage.  
In the sub-sample of middle-aged firms (cluster 2), the effect of the family control and 
influence dimension is no longer significant, whereas the family identity dimension has a positive 
and significant coefficient. Therefore, after the early stage, the family identity dimension starts to 
play a pivotal role in ED decisions, leading family businesses that bear the family name to 
increase ED. In addition, in middle-aged firms the presence of a CSR committee positively 
affects ED, while the firm’s profitability has a negative and significant effect. 
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Finally, the results for old firms (cluster 3) are consistent with the regression results for 
middle-aged firms, as family control and influence does not have a significant effect on ED. 
However, contrary to our expectation, we find a negative and significant coefficient of 
IDENTITY_FF, so the family identity dimension has a negative effect on ED in family firms as 
they grow older.  
 
4.3 Additional analysis and robustness tests9 
Prior work suggests that the reliance on SEW declines in distressed firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007), so the extent to which the two dimensions of SEW drive the ED decision might be 
affected by the firm’s profitability. We perform additional analyses separately for more 
profitable vs. less profitable firms, splitting the sample on the firms’ median net income. We find 
that more profitable family firms that prioritise the family control and influence are less willing 
to provide ED than other firms, while family firms in which the family identity dimension 
prevails provide more voluntary ED. Less profitable family firms are less likely to report ED 
than more profitable family firms are, regardless of which SEW dimension is more pronounced. 
This result corroborates the argument that the extent to which family firms use SEW to frame 
ED decisions depends on contextual factors.   
We also consider that ED may be a more cosmetic than substantive activity that has the 
primary purpose of gaining or maintaining legitimacy (Michelon et al., 2015). Hence, our results 
might be affected by the presence of unverifiable soft information a firm voluntarily discloses to 
manipulate stakeholders’ perceptions. To address this concern, we excluded from our ED 
measure soft qualitative information that was, for example, related to initiatives that mitigate the 
environmental impact of company activities. We re-ran our analysis using only ‘hard’ ED (i.e., 
quantitative information concerning materials, water, greenhouse emissions, monetary value, or 
                                                 
9 Results of these analyses are available from the authors upon request. 
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number of non-monetary environment-related sanctions) as the dependent variable. The results 
of this additional analysis are consistent with our main evidence. 
We also conducted several other robustness tests, the results of all of which aligned with 
the main evidence reported in Table 4. First, to remove the subjectivity of the multiple scale 
coding for the measurement of disclosure, we repeated the multivariate analysis using a non-
weighted metric for ED. Second, to ensure that the family’s nature is captured accurately, we re-
ran the analysis using an alternative definition of family firms that considers the presence of the 
family both in ownership and in administrative positions (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006). We identified family-controlled firms as those in which members of a single 
family held more than half of the capital directly or through other entities while at least one 
family member was on the firm’s board or had a managerial position10. Third, we acknowledged 
that, although the variable AGE is intended to capture the family’s need to retain control and the 
emotional attachment to the firm along its life cycle, it could also be a rough proxy for the 
strength of socio-emotional considerations in the firm. Therefore, since these factors may also 
change across generations (Cruz and Nordqvist, 2012), we re-ran the analysis using the 
generation in charge (GEN) as a moderator to account for the possibility that older firms are still 
in earlier generational stages. We conducted additional regression analyses using the natural 
logarithm of employees as an alternative proxy for firm size and an alternative specification of 
the model, clustering standard errors for firms. Finally, extant studies (Berrone et al., 2012; Cruz 
et al., 2014) document that family firms and non-family firms differ in their CSR practices, so 
we re-ran our analysis to control for the level of environmental performance as proxied by the 
ENVSCORE in the Asset4 Thomson Reuters Database. Results for the sub-sample of firms with 
environmental performance data remained unchanged11. 
                                                 
10 Following Minichilli et al. (2010), we also considered a cut-off of 30 percent of firm ownership directly or indirectly 
held by a single family, as this threshold must be met for a tender offer in the Draghi Law (D. lgs 58/1998). We also re-
ran our analysis using the largest percentage of shares held by a single family as a non-binary variable to capture the 
family control, and our main results remained unchanged. 
11 We decided not to include this control in the main analysis, as the limited coverage of this database for our sample 




This study relies on the SEW approach to explain voluntary ED behaviour in family firms. Our 
results are generally consistent with the argument that family businesses consider the preservation 
of SEW in their ED decisions (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) but, they indicate that the effects of each 
of the two SEW dimensions cannot be studied in isolation, without considering the firm’s life cycle 
stage. 
We show that the detrimental effect of the family control and influence dimension on 
voluntary ED is limited to early stages of family firms’ life cycle. In these circumstances, the 
increased stakeholder pressure and regulatory scrutiny that follows the release of proprietary 
disclosures, such as those related to companies’ processes for managing and measuring 
environmental efficiency, might obstruct the family’s control over the business, threatening the 
preservation of its SEW. This finding is aligned with studies that, following a traditional agency-
based approach, report less transparency in family firms than in their non-family-owned 
counterparts (Ho and Wong, 2001; Lakhal 2005; Chen et al., 2008). However, we diverge from 
these studies’ findings by suggesting that family firms might provide less ED when family control 
and influence is at stake, even when doing so comes at a financial cost (e.g., higher cost of equity 
capital and lower firm value). The results also support the argument that the firm’s need to retain 
control over the business and related secrecy is higher in the early stages of the life cycle, when the 
first generation is usually in place (Sonfield and Lussier, 2004). We document that, as family firms 
become more mature, the negative effect on ED of the family control and influence dimension 
disappears. 
Our study also expands on previous findings pertaining to the positive link between 
family identity and financial reporting transparency (Pazzaglia et al., 2013; Achleitner et al., 
2014; Martin et al., 2016). Our evidence that middle-aged family firms that prioritise the family 
identity dimension provide more ED supports the argument that family firms that carry the 
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family name are particularly motivated to protect and improve their firms’ reputations and to 
protect the family’s identity (Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013). We show that a firm’s concern 
for communicating responsible stewardship toward the environment becomes more evident after 
the early stage in its life cycle, leading it to enhance ED to project a positive image of the family 
in the community. This result is consistent with prior findings that indicate family firms’ 
propensity to disseminate CSR information (Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Campopiano and de 
Massis, 2015), but we show that this propensity is especially true when the family name is part 
of the firm’s name and when the firms is young.  
Finally, the negative relationship between the family identity dimension and ED in old 
family firms deserves some discussion. This relationship challenges the frequent claim that that a 
powerful family identity dimension always leads family firms to be forthcoming. This 
unexpected finding could be the result of several concurrent circumstances: (i) the reduced 
family attachment to the business by family members in subsequent generations (Salvato and 
Melin, 2008); (ii) the fragmentation of family ownership among multiple branches, which is 
often accompanied by conflicting agendas (Villalonga and Amit, 2006); (iii) the passive role of 
family members who occupy managerial positions (Lussier and Sonfield, 2010), and (iv) the 
presence of external professional managers and the accompanying increased complexity of firm 
governance (Breton-Miller and Miller, 2013). In all of these circumstances, the predominance of 
SEW-related considerations decreases, leaving more room for opportunism since family 
members tend to treat the firm as a personal resource (Gersick et al., 1997; Schulze et al., 2003). 
As a consequence, during the maturity stage, family firms that bear the family name might be 
less keen about voluntary ED, preferring instead to take advantage of the lack of transparency to 




Family businesses have been the subject of hundreds of studies by management and accounting 
scholars (Prencipe et al., 2014), but no clear message has emerged regarding the implications for 
ED practices of the multifaceted dimensions of family firms (Salvato and Moores, 2010). This 
study shows that the fear of losing control leads family firms that prioritise the family control 
and influence dimension to be unforthcoming about ED, especially in the early stages of their 
life cycle, when they are more sensitive to their SEW than to economic considerations. Our 
evidence also supports the positive effect on ED of the family identity dimension in middle-aged 
family firms, when the presence of the family name as part of the firm’s name increases 
reputation-related concerns and leads the firm to show environmental stewardship through 
increased ED. This study contributes in several ways to the management literature and the family 
business field in particular. First, by addressing the link between family firms and voluntary ED, 
this paper complements extant studies on family businesses and mandatory reporting practices 
(Ali et al., 2007; Prencipe et al., 2008) and the growing literature on family firms and 
sustainability practices (Block and Wagner, 2014; Campopiano and de Massis, 2015) by 
showing how two dimensions of SEW play a role in explaining their distinctive behaviour in 
regards to ED. It also complements the studies on sustainability disclosure (Burrit, 2002; 
Nyquist, 2003; Martin and Hadley, 2008; Vormedal and Ruud, 2009; Fujii et al., 2013; Pedersen 
et al., 2013; Stanny, 2013) by providing new evidence on the still under-explored Italian setting, 
which is characterized by highly concentrated ownership structures and many family-owned 
firms (Noci, 2000; Secchi 2006). 
Second, by relying on the SEW theoretical lens to explain family firms’ ED choices, this 
paper expands the SEW literature that examines the difference between family firms and non-
family firms in terms of diversification, risk-taking, R&D investments, and other strategic 
decisions (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Chrisman and Patel, 2012). This 
approach is particularly suitable for examinations of family businesses’ ED practices, as it 
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derives its theoretical rationales from family businesses’ reality, rather than adjusting them to the 
setting of family firms (Berrone et al., 2012).  
Third, in contrast to the large body of US-based research, most of which discriminates 
between family firms and nonfamily firms in terms of the degree of ownership concentration 
(Ali et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010), this paper explores the influence of family-related 
characteristics on reporting practices by differentiating among family firms based on the most 
salient SEW dimension. 
From a practical point of view, the evidence provided here may be of help to investors by 
encouraging them to think carefully about how family firms’ preferences and priorities shape 
their ED. Our evidence is also useful to managers of family firms, who are encouraged not to 
take for granted that traditional reporting practices can be universally applicable to the case of 
ED, as the decision to disclose environmental information is the result of tension between the 
external demand for information and the potential SEW losses that may accrue to the family 
firm, which could also decrease the level of corporate transparency. Finally, our results could be 
useful to regulators and standards-setters, as they contribute to the debate concerning whether 
and to what extent ED should be included in companies’ mandatory disclosures and call for the 
corporate governance mechanisms that fit family firms’ idiosyncratic incentive structure to foster 
their transparency and accountability to stakeholders. 
We foresee several venues for future research. First, following Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007, 
2010), Berrone et al. (2010), and Deephouse and Janskiewicz (2013), we focus on the 
dimensions of family control and influence and family identity and draw on secondary data to 
explore their implications for family firms’ ED decisions. Although our study takes a first step in 
this direction, our approach may not fully capture the complexity of the SEW concept (Berrone 
et al., 2012). Future research could rely on primary data based on interviews with family 
principals to differentiate among other SEW dimensions. Second, our research has limitations 
with regard to the type of the family firms covered. Although listed family firms account for 
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most of Italy’s shareholding market (Aidaf, 2017), they are not representative of the universe of 
family businesses. Future research could examine the extent to which family preferences and 
priorities drive ED decisions in private family businesses, taking into account the role of other 
individual and organizational conditions (e.g., the roles of founders, CEOs, the generational 
stage, and firm size). Finally, our research focuses on ED in CSR stand-alone reports, so future 
research could explore how family businesses use SEW to frame how ED is disseminated 
through various reporting media (e.g., integrated reporting, media, press). 
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Table 1. Coding Scheme 
Materials Emissions, effluents and waste 
 EN1 Materials used by weight or volume.  EN16 
Total direct and indirect greenhouse gas 
emissions by weight. 
 EN2 
Percentage of materials used that are 
recycled input materials. 
 EN17 
Other relevant indirect greenhouse gas 
emissions by weight. 
Energy   EN18 
Initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
and reductions achieved. 
 EN3 
Direct energy consumption by primary 
energy source. 
 EN19 
Emissions of ozone-depleting substances by 
weight. 
 EN4 
Indirect energy consumption by primary 
source. 
 EN20 
NOx, SOx, and other significant air emissions 
by type and weight. 
 EN5 
Energy saved due to conservation and 
efficiency improvements. 
 EN21 
Total water discharge by quality and 
destination. 
 EN6 
Initiatives to provide energy-efficient or 
renewable energy based products and 
services, and reductions in energy 
requirements as a result of these 
initiatives. 
 EN22 
Total weight of waste by type and disposal 
method. 
 EN7 
Initiatives to reduce indirect energy 
consumption and reductions achieved. 
 EN23 Total number and volume of significant spills. 
Water 
  EN24 
Weight of transported, imported, exported, or 
treated waste deemed hazardous under the 
terms of the Basel Convention Annex I, II, III, 
and VIII, and percentage of transported waste 
shipped internationally. 
 EN8 Total water withdrawal by source.  EN25 
Identity, size, protected status, and biodiversity 
value of water bodies and related habitats 
significantly affected by the reporting 
organization’s discharges of water and runoff. 
 EN9 
Water sources significantly affected by 
withdrawal of water. 
 
Products and services 
 EN10 
Percentage and total volume of water 
recycled and reused. 
 EN26 
Initiatives to mitigate environmental impacts of 
products and services, and extent of impact 
mitigation. 
Biodiversity  EN27 
Percentage of products sold and their 
packaging materials that are reclaimed by 
category. 
 EN11 
Location and size of land owned, leased, 
managed in, or adjacent to, protected 
areas and areas of high biodiversity value 
outside protected areas. 
Compliance 
 EN12 
Description of significant impacts of 
activities, products, and services on 
biodiversity in protected areas and areas 
of high biodiversity value outside 
protected areas. 
 EN28 
Monetary value of significant fines and total 
number of non-monetary sanctions for non-
compliance with environmental laws and 
regulations. 
 EN13 Habitats protected or restored. Transport 
 EN14 
Strategies, current actions, and future 
plans for managing impacts on 
biodiversity. 
 EN29 
Significant environmental impacts of 
transporting products and other goods and 
materials used for the organization’s 
operations, and transporting members of the 
workforce. 
 EN15 
Number of IUCN Red List species and 
national conservation list species with 
habitats in areas affected by operations, 
by level of extinction risk. 
Overall  
        EN30 
Total environmental protection expenditures 
and investments by type. 
 
 32 
Table 2. Variable description  
Variable Definition Measurement 
ENV_D Environmental disclosure index  
Weighted index that compares the actual 
environmental disclosure with total possible 
environmental disclosure 
CONTROL_FF 
Family firms that prioritize family 
control and influence dimension of 
the SEW  
Binary variable equals 1 if single family hold more 
than 50% of the capital directly or through other 
entities 
IDENTITY_FF 
Family firms that prioritize family 
identity dimension of the SEW  
Binary variable equals 1 if single family hold more 
than 50% of the capital directly or through other 
entities and the family business carries the family 
name 
AGE Firm life-cycle 
Natural logarithm of the number of years since the 
foundation date  
CSR_COM CSR unit 
Binary variable equals 1 if there is a manager or a 
unit responsible for CSR policies 
CEO_FAMILY Family CEO 
Binary variable equals 1 if CEO belongs to the 
controlling family; 0 otherwise 
IND_BOD Board independence Number of independent directors sitting on the board 
N_BOD Board size Number of directors sitting on the board 
SIZE Firm size Natural logarithm of total asset 
LEVERAGE Leverage  Total liabilities divided by total equity 
PROFIT Firm profitability Operating income divided by total asset 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix  
  mean p50 sd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 ENV_D 0.098 0 0.246 1.000           
2 CONTROL_FF 0.534 0 0.499 -0.200*** 1.000          
3 IDENTITY_FF 0.145 0 0.353 -0.026 0.385*** 1.000         
4 AGE 3.417 3.401 0.732 -0.006 0.059 0.069 1.000        
5 CSR_COM 0.159 0 0.366 0.556*** -0.049 -0.019 0.096 1.000       
6 CEO_FAMILY 0.340 0 0.474 -0.105 0.347*** 0.098 0.024 -0.133* 1.000      
7 IND_BOD 4.062 3 2.481 0.328*** -0.137* -0.026 0.053 0.265*** -0.092 1.000     
8 N_BOD 9.364 9 3.003 0.244*** -0.049 0.038 0.120* 0.247*** -0.087 0.687*** 1.000    
9 SIZE 6.209 5.903 1.846 0.573*** -0.093 0.038 0.138* 0.430*** -0.114 0.522*** 0.530*** 1.000   
10 LEVERAGE 2.147 1.799 1.431 0.178** -0.033 0.060 0.112 0.045 0.026 0.216*** 0.100 0.215*** 1.000  
11 PROFIT -0.007 0.005 0.094 0.077 0.217*** 0.164** 0.026 0.109 -0.020 0.035 0.118* 0.204*** 0.007 1.000 
*,**,*** denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and10% level (two-tailed). The table reports descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix among variables of 




Table 4. Results for family control and influence, family identity and firm life cycle  
  ENV_D 































 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed). The table reports the results from the moderated regression 
analysis to test the influence of family control and influence, family identity dimensions of SEW on ED 
and the role of the firm life cycle.  CONTROL_FF_AGE is the interaction term between 
CONTROL_FF and AGE. IDENTITY_FF_AGE is the interaction term between IDENTITY_FF and 
AGE. All variables are defined in Table 2.  
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Table 5. Results for Family control and influence and family identity at different stages 
of the firm’s life cycle  
Panel A. Distribution of firm age by clusters 
Cluster N min mean p50 max sd 
Young firms 63 3 11.952 12 17 3.717 
Middle-aged firm 148 18 30.040 29 46 7.651 
Old firms 77 47 80.581 72 161 30.050 
Total 288 3 39.506 30 161 30.500 
Panel A reports the distribution of firm in the three clusters obtained from a cluster analysis performed 
to identify different stages of the firm’s life cycle according to the firm’s age. All variables are defined 
in Table 2. 
 
Panel B. Cluster analysis results 






Old firms’ cluster 
  
   
CONTROL_FF -0.178** -0.056 -0.034 
 
(0.079) (0.035) (0.047) 
IDENTITY_FF -0.184 0.154*** -0.235*** 
 
(0.117) (0.044) (0.051) 
CSR_COM -0.018 0.378*** 0.330*** 
 
(0.099) (0.047) (0.046) 
CEO_FAMILY 0.060 0.003 -0.013 
 (0.069) (0.032) (0.046) 
IND_BOD -0.010 0.016 -0.024*** 
 
(0.017) (0.010) (0.009) 
N_BOD 0.0172 -0.022** -0.021*** 
 
(0.017) (0.0096) (0.007) 
SIZE 0.134*** 0.067*** 0.070*** 
 
(0.034) (0.014) (0.013) 
LEVERAGE 0.054*** -0.016 -0.008 
 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.014) 
PROFIT 0.185 -0.499*** 0.288 
 
(0.350) (0.189) (0.226) 
Constant    -0.611**             -0.258       -0.160 
 
       (0.289)        (0.183)         (0.147) 
INDUSTRY_FE YES YES YES 
YEAR_FE YES YES YES 
Observations        63       148       77 
R-squared        0.805        0.693        0.913 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed). Panel B reports the results for the role of family 
control and influence and family identity dimensions at different stages of the firm’s life cycle 
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obtained running Equation 1 separately for the three sub-groups of identified with the cluster 
analysis. Column 1 reports results for the cluster of young firms. Column 2 reports results for the 
cluster of middle-aged firms. Column 3 reports results for the cluster of old firms. All variables are 
defined in Table 2.  
 
 
 
